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Abstract Natural hazards have the potential to trigger
complex chains of events in technological installations
leading to disastrous effects for the surrounding population
and environment. The threat of climate change of wors-
ening extreme weather events exacerbates the need for new
models and novel methodologies able to capture the com-
plexity of the natural-technological interaction in intuitive
frameworks suitable for an interdisciplinary field such as
that of risk analysis. This study proposes a novel approach
for the quantification of risk exposure of nuclear facilities
subject to extreme natural events. A Bayesian Network
model, initially developed for the quantification of the risk
of exposure from spent nuclear material stored in facilities
subject to flooding hazards, is adapted and enhanced to
include in the analysis the quantification of the uncertainty
affecting the output due to the imprecision of data available
and the aleatory nature of the variables involved. The
model is applied to the analysis of the nuclear power sta-
tion of Sizewell B in East Anglia (UK), through the use of
a novel computational tool. The network proposed models
the direct effect of extreme weather conditions on the
facility along several time scenarios considering climate
change predictions as well as the indirect effects of external
hazards on the internal subsystems and the occurrence of
human error. The main novelty of the study consists of the
fully computational integration of Bayesian Networks with
advanced Structural Reliability Methods, which allows to
adequately represent both aleatory and epistemic aspects of
the uncertainty affecting the input through the use of
probabilistic models, intervals, imprecise random variables
as well as probability bounds. The uncertainty affecting the
output is quantified in order to attest the significance of the
results and provide a complete and effective tool for risk-
informed decision making.
Keywords Risk analysis  Enhanced Bayesian Networks 
Epistemic uncertainty  Stochastic models  Imprecise
probabilities  Climate change  Spent fuel
1 Introduction
The potential of natural hazards to trigger simultaneous
failures and, in worse cases, technological disasters [com-
monly known as Natech accidents (Krausmann and Bar-
anzini 2012)] has progressively nourished the concern of
both the scientific community and the public opinion,
contributing to increase the awareness toward the intrinsic
vulnerability of technological installations to the effect of
extreme weather conditions. The gravity of such issues is
borne out by projections available on the future trends of
global climate, which are expected to lead to an intensifi-
cation of extreme events. This growth of the risk seems to
interest particularly coastal areas as a result of the com-
bination of global sea level rise and the predicted increase
of extreme wind and rain events: this arises the risks of
flooding along shorelines, threatening numerous techno-
logical installations which are been long located on the
coast (Evans 2004; Levy and Hall 2005). Several studies
already confirm the correctness of these forecasts: a
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significant increase in heavy precipitation for the twentieth
century has been observed on both global and local scales
(Trenberth et al. 2007; Maraun et al. 2008). According to
the work of Seneviratne et al. (2012), this trend is consis-
tent with the estimated consequences of anthropogenic
forcing and is expected to endure in the near future: most
geographical areas are not only predicted to be subject to a
significant increase of the overall frequency of heavy pre-
cipitation, but are also expected to experience higher
severity, with a larger proportion of extreme events over
the totality of the occurrences (Trenberth et al. 2007).
Focusing on a local scale, the number of days with pre-
cipitations over 25 mm are expected to increase up to a
factor of 3.5 during the winter in the central and southern
regions of UK by 2080 (MetOffice 2014). The changes in
atmospheric storminess are predicted to affect, together
with the increase of mean sea level, the occurrence of
extremes in coastal high water levels (Wu et al. 2016).
Also in this case the predictions are corroborated by current
observations: data collected over ten years (from 1993 to
2003) have shown an average growth rate of 3.1 mm/year
for mean sea level (Bindoff et al. 2007). Finally few
studies, even if dealing with strong uncertainty, seem to
suggest a local upward drift in extreme winds (Rauthe et al.
2010) and winter wind storms (Pinto et al. 2007). In
addition to this, the significant increase of utilisation
experienced by coastal areas over the twentieth century
contributes to increase the risks associated with the
occurrence of flooding along shorelines. This trend is
expected to endure through the current century with a
coastal population estimated to grow of a factor between
1.5 and 4.3 by 2080 (Nicholls et al. 2007): the large and
growing presence of communities and industrial facilities
in coastal areas contributes to widen the hazardous areas
and the related risks, including the increase of Natech
accident occurrence. This suggests the need for mitigation
measures to enhance both the robustness of existing
installations and the design standards for new and more
reliable systems. Due to the delicacy of safety issues in the
nuclear sector and in light of past events, the nuclear
industry must play a key role in the research of new
solutions to efficiently tackle the current and future risks
posed by natural hazards (Weightman et al. 2011).
The analysis of the vulnerability of nuclear facilities to
external hazards, such as those represented by weather
extremes, are still few and mainly focused on the reactor
safety (Musolas et al. 2015). Less concerns are generally
addressed to the spent fuel ponds (SFP, referred as pools in
American English) which still have the potential to trigger
dramatic accident scenarios in the case of exposure of the
spent fuel stored. According to the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, this event, even if unlikely to occur, would
have high-impact consequences, eventually causing one or
more zirconium fires in the facility (Collins and Hubbard
2001). It is hence essential to focus on the reliability of
these systems for a more accurate assessment of the vul-
nerability of nuclear installations and the identification of
effective risk mitigation measures.
A crucial point of risk assessment in the nuclear
industry, and more generally in the case of complex tech-
nological systems, is represented by the computational and
theoretical tools available. The models and methodologies
adopted for the analysis should not only be able to depict
the overall mechanisms behind the possible accident sce-
narios, but also provide information useful for long-term
decision making as well as for supporting decision makers
in the case of imminent danger (Cruz et al. 2004). Fur-
thermore, the approach selected should guarantee an ade-
quate representation of the complexity of the system under
study and of the interactions among its subsystems,
allowing the analysis of different scenarios and taking
explicitly into account the uncertainty affecting the input,
with particular regards to climate change projections
(Keller 2009), and its propagation within the model. This
study proposes a multi-disciplinary model for the robust
quantification of the risk exposure of spent nuclear facili-
ties introducing the use of a novel computational tool and
methodology able to take into account the imprecision
affecting the data (through the use of imprecise probabili-
ties) and thus to quantify the uncertainty affecting the
output. The approach adopted is based on the use of
graphical models, namely Bayesian Networks (BNs). This
choice has been dictated by the capability of BNs to tackle
many challenging aspects of the kind of analysis per-
formed: first of all, differently from deterministic methods
which still are widely adopted in industry (Jerome Tixier
et al. 2002), a probabilistic approach such as BNs offers
unquestionable advantages, providing a more realistic and
systematic estimate of risk and safety and including the
uncertainty affecting the initial knowledge in the analysis.
Second, as generally true for graphical models, BNs pro-
vide a common intuitive language easily understandable
and widely recognized regardless the personal background
of the user. This is an essential requirement in view of the
strongly interdisciplinary nature of risk analysis of com-
plex systems subject to natural hazards, which implies the
collaboration of experts from very different fields of sci-
ence and industry (e.g. seismologists, hydrologists, mete-
orologists, process engineers, psychologists, government
officials, emergency managers etc.) (Straub 2005). The
intuitivity of the approach makes BNs an accessible sup-
porting tool for decision makers, who are expected to be
the final users of the type of analysis performed in this
study, and can potentially facilitate the communication of
risk to the public, filling the communication gap existing
between these realities (Sivakumar 2011). Furthermore, in
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comparison with more common methodologies such as
fault tree analysis, BNs present several advantages, over-
coming several restrictive assumptions implicit in the fault
tree methodology (e.g., the restriction to Boolean logic),
providing the adequate representation of complex depen-
dencies among components, including uncertainty in the
model and allowing both forward and backward analysis
(Bobbio et al. 2001). In light of this, BNs are particularly
suitable for capturing the complexity of the systems and the
mechanisms behind multiple failures. This allows the
analysts to effectively assess the likelihood of domino
effects within the facility and to fully understand the pos-
sible consequences of simultaneous failures, widely
regarded as the most critical threat posed by natural haz-
ards to technological installations. Third, thanks to the
availability of algorithms for the analytical computation of
inference (i.e. exact inference), BNs are able to handle very
small values of probabilities. This capability plays a crucial
role in the assessment of low probability-high impact
events such as weather extremes and natural hazards.
Finally, BNs offer a consistent framework to coherently
integrate sources of information of very different natures
(e.g. experimental measurements, projections, historical
data, computational models etc) thus to combine empirical
information with mechanical models and engineering
judgement. In particular, thanks to Bayesian statistics
which is the mathematical background of this approach,
BNs allow the inclusion of subjective information, such as
experts opinions, which have an essential role in areas of
research strongly affected by uncertainty and lack of data.
This is the case of natural hazards for which useful his-
torical data are often not available due to the high vari-
ability of both frequencies and consequences.
Nevertheless, traditional BNs are mainly restricted to
the use of discrete probability values which cannot fully
capture the intrinsically aleatory nature of natural events
nor the epistemic uncertainty affecting the data available.
This limitation, as highlighted in previous studies (Tolo
et al. 2016), strongly straitens the ability of the method to
model, with equal effectiveness, the information related to
both natural hazards and technological installations.
A novel approach is proposed in this study in order to
overcome these constraints and provide a complete tool for
decision making support. The method adopted allows to
integrate within the BN framework different kinds of
mathematical models tailored on the features of the vari-
ables involved but also their uncertainty, which has the
potential to undermine the credibility of the results
obtained. Indeed, a meticulous and accurate analysis can-
not disregard the degree of uncertainty affecting the data on
which the decision is based. This kind of information
provides a sort of context for the numerical results
obtained, bounding their significance and hence measuring
the effectiveness and accuracy of the analysis itself. In
other words, the lack of information and hence the igno-
rance regarding a certain process are themselves an
essential part of the information and must be made avail-
able to adequately support risk-informed decisions. The
efficiency of the computational implementation of such
approach, referred to as Enhanced Bayesian Networks
(EBNs), is guaranteed by the adoption of robust and cut-
ting-edge numerical methods borrowed from the field of
structural reliability. Thanks to this, the tool implemented
results suitable for both long-term and near-real time
decision making support.
The method proposed is illustrated in this study through
the implementation of a network for the vulnerability
assessment of nuclear facilities subject to external hazards,
and its application to the Sizewell B nuclear power plant
facility in East Anglia, UK. In more detail, the framework
consists of an Enhanced Bayesian Network which includes
discrete variables as well as intervals, random and impre-
cise random variables (e.g., random variables whose
uncertain parameters are intervals) and probabilistically
bounded parameters. Furthermore it involves secondary
models related to different subjects, from climate change to
human error and coastal reliability issues. Probability
bounds are calculated for several failure events (and dif-
ferent accident scenarios) associated with the exposure of
the spent nuclear fuel stored on site. The results obtained
are discussed in order to demonstrate the advantages and
limitations of the proposed methodology.
2 Methodology
This section aims to give an overview of the theoretical
background of the methodology adopted and to briefly
describe the computational tool implemented for its
application.
2.1 Bayesian Networks
Bayesian Networks (BNs) are statistical models based on
the use of directed acyclic graphs. As any graphical model,
BNs present a double nature: on the one hand, the structure
of the problem under study is reproduced by a graphical
framework, where nodes stand for random variables and
edges represent the causal relationship existing between
two nodes. On the other hand, the strength of the depen-
dencies between variables is expressed through the intro-
duction of Conditional Probability Distributions (CPDs).
These are tensors collecting the numerical parameters of
the network, i.e. the conditional probabilities associated
with the outcomes of any node of the network given an
instantiation of its parents. Conversely, when a node is not
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linked to any parent it is referred as a root of the network
and associated with marginal probability distributions.
With regards to the simple example in Fig. 1, the node X1
can be identify as a root of the network as well as the
parent of X2 and X3, which are also referred to as its
children. BNs satisfy the local Markov condition according
to which values of a variable remain conditionally inde-
pendent of its non-descendants given its parent variables.
The main strength of BNs consists of their capability to
factorize the joint probability over any set of variables
X ¼ fX1;X2; :::;Xng forming the network by simply
exploiting the knowledge available regarding their condi-
tional dependencies. Indeed, according to Bayes’ theorem,
such joint probability can be expressed as:
PðXÞ ¼
Y
i
pðXijpaðXiÞÞ ð1Þ
where pðXijpaðXiÞÞ is the conditional density function of
the node Xi while paðXiÞ denotes possible instantiations of
its parents. Generally, inference with BNs involves the
calculation of the posterior marginal probability for a query
variable. The key feature of BNs consists of updating this
information when new information become available. This
allows not only to update the belief toward a certain event
(and is indeed referred as belief updating) on the basis of
the information gathered but also to take into account
possible what-if scenarios. This is obtained introducing
evidence in the network: for example, the evidence
E ¼ fX3 ¼ x3;1g fixes the values of variables X3, assigning
to it the outcome x3;1. Hence, the distribution for the query
variable X1 given the evidence E over the variables XE ¼
fX1;X3g can be expressed as:
P X1 x3;1
  ¼ P X1; x3;1
 
P x3;1
  ¼
P
XnX1[x3;1 pðXÞP
Xnx3;1 pðXÞ
ð2Þ
Several algorithms, both exact and approximate, are
available in the literature for the extrapolation of proba-
bilistic information regarding one or more query variables
on the basis of the BN structure (process generally known
as inference). Exact inference algorithms (e.g., junction
tree algorithm) are robust and well-established in scientific
literature but generally restricted to the use of crisp values
for the network parameters. This implies the discretization
of continuous random variables, impoverishing the quality
of the information available. Approximate approach is
generally based on simulation techniques (e.g., Markov
chain Monte Carlo methods), allowing to perform infer-
ence on continuous nodes. The main drawbacks of this
option are the computational time required for the simu-
lations and the unknown rates of convergence. Moreover,
approximate inference presents significant limitations in
computing low probabilities of rare events, in particular
with regards to near-real-time inference and decision
analysis (Straub and Kiureghian 2010). Please refer to the
work of Pearl and Russell for a complete overview of
Bayesian Networks (Pearl and Russell 2000).
The first studies on BNs were proposed by Judea Pearl
and date back to the early eighties (Pearl 1985), but the
lack of robust algorithms and computational resources has
initially slowed down the development of this technique.
Conversely, with the rapid establishment of advanced
computer technology, it has attracted large interest in
various sectors of science and engineering (Weber et al.
2012). The attractiveness of this approach in the field of
risk assessment can be attributed to the capabilities of
dealing with very low-probability events (Hanea and Ale
2009), modelling elaborate networks of dependencies (as
those characterizing complex systems) (Khakzad et al.
2013) and, most of all, integrating information of different
nature, from experimental data to expert judgements
(Cheon et al. 2009; Kim et al. 2006). All these aspects
make BNs particularly attractive in the study of natural
hazards and their interaction with technological installa-
tions (Straub 2005; Bayraktarli et al. 2005; Tolo et al.
2014).
2.2 Bayesian Networks Enhanced with system
reliability methods
The adoption of exact algorithms for the computation of
inference on BNs is generally recognised as a more robust
and accurate approach in comparison to approximate
analysis. On the other hand, the restrictions of this kind of
computation, generally limited to the use of crisp proba-
bility values, significantly affect the capability of models to
capture reality and hence the information available. This is
rarely provided in the form of crisp numbers and results
always affected by a certain degree of uncertainty which, if
not adequately integrated in the analysis, can easily lead to
misleading results. To adapt the data available to the use of
exact inference algorithms, a discretization procedure is
required for continuous variables: this inevitably depletes
the quality of the initial information and subsequently the
accuracy of the models. The methodology referred to as
Enhanced Bayesian Network (EBN) allows to bypass this
practice overcoming the limitations of the traditional
approach. It consists of combining BNs with system reli-
ability methods, which are adopted in order to reduce the
initial models, containing both discrete and continuous
X1
X3 X2
Fig. 1 Graphical structure of a
simple Bayesian Network
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variables, to traditional BNs and thus allowing the com-
putation of exact inference. In this study the existent
methodology has been extended to the use of imprecise
probabilities, such as intervals and imprecise random
variables: if such variables are present in the initial net-
work, the reduced model will not be a traditional BN but a
BN including probability bounds. Nevertheless, the prop-
agation of bounds in the network can still be performed
adopting exact inference algorithms (Tho¨ne et al. 1997).
The assumption at the basis of the EBN approach is that
any node child of one or more non-discrete nodes has to be
represented as a function of these variables, hence char-
acterized as domains in the outcome space of its parents.
The computation of the conditional probability value of a
child node can hence be translated into a reliability prob-
lem and solved through the use of well-known system
reliability methods. Such a computation automatically
releases the child node from the causal links which connect
it to its non-discrete parents, allowing the progressive
removal of continuous nodes from the network which
finally would include only discrete variables.
Taking into account the example in Fig. 2 and consid-
ering Eq.(1), the joint probability over the discrete vari-
ables D1 and D2 would result:
PðD1;D2Þ ¼
Z
C1
pðD1ÞpðD2jD1;C1Þf ðC1ÞdC1 ð3Þ
where pðD1Þ, pðD2jD1;C1Þ are the probability values
included in the CPDs of D1 and D2 respectively, while
f ðC1Þ is a continuous probability density function associ-
ated with the probabilistic node C1. Since D1 is indepen-
dent from C1 according to the local Markov condition, the
integral of interest can be rearranged as:
PðD2jD1Þ ¼
Z
C1
pðD2jD1;C1Þf ðC1ÞdC1 ð4Þ
In light of the initial assumption, D2 results to be a
function of its non-discrete parent C1 for any instantiation
of the discrete parent D1. In other words, each entry of the
CPD of D2 is defined by a domain X
d2
D2;d1 in the space of C1
given D1 ¼ d1. Hence, Eq.(4) can be further modified
(Straub and Kiureghian 2010):
PðD2jD1Þ ¼
Z
Xd2D2;d1
f ðC1ÞdC1 ð5Þ
The formulation of the problem obtained in Eq.(5) is
equivalent to that of traditional reliability problems solved
adopting reliability methods.
Indeed, various strategies for the solution of this integral
are available in the literature, such as numerical integration
techniques, Monte Carlo simulations (Hammersley and
Handscomb 1964) and asymptotic Laplace expansions
(Rackwitz 2001). Common approximate solutions largely
adopted in practice are First-Order and Second-Order
Reliability Methods (Hasofer and Lind 1974), which
ensure low computational costs but generally perform
poorly in high dimensional spaces or in the case of strongly
non-linear domains. A range of advanced sampling tech-
niques, such as Importance Sampling, Line Sampling,
Stratified Sampling etc., have been developed quite
recently in order to overcome the limitations of approxi-
mate reliability methods on the one hand, reducing the cost
associated with the traditional MC approach on the other.
2.3 Proposed computational approach
Differently from previous applications of EBN available in
the literature, the methodology has been extended to
include intervals and imprecise random variables within
the framework of the initial network. The aim of the pro-
posed computational approach is to efficiently accomplish
such integration, which implies the resolution of equations
similar to that in Eq.(5) also when non-probabilistic vari-
ables (i.e. intervals and imprecise random variables) are
involved. The field of structural reliability offers a wide
range of numerical strategies suitable for the fulfilment of
this task: in the computational tool implemented, several of
these methods have been selected and fully integrated with
the BN approach. It is worth highlighting that the use of
structural reliability methods is justified merely by the
common numerical configuration of the computation under
study [i.e. identification of conditional probability of nodes
children of non-discrete variables as for Eq.(5)] and the
traditional structural reliability problem, and does not
necessarily imply a conceptual correspondence between
structural reliability and risk exposure quantification. This
introduces two main advantages: on the one hand, the data
available can be captured accurately avoiding the intro-
duction of unmotivated assumptions. This would signifi-
cantly enhance the robustness of the model in comparison
with traditional approaches which force the analyst to
choose, more or less arbitrarily, a precise distribution not
fully justified by the data available. On the other hand, the
explicitly depiction of the imprecision affecting the input
allows tracking the propagation of this latter within the
D1
D2
C1 D1
D2
Fig. 2 Reduction of a simple EBN containing a continuous node to a
BN including only discrete variables, where C1 refers to a continuous
node and D1 and D2 to discrete nodes
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model, quantifying the degree of uncertainty of the output
and providing a crucial information for risk-informed
decision making. In light of this, if the initial network
contains non-probabilistic but continuous nodes, the
reduced network is not a traditional BN containing only
crisp parameters but instead includes nodes whose out-
comes are associated with probability bounds.
The methodology proposed has been implemented in the
general purpose software OpenCossan (Patelli et al.
2012, 2014; Patelli 2016) in an object oriented fashion.
This ensures programming flexibility, computational effi-
ciency and allows to avoid code duplication. OpenCossan
is a collections of methods and tools under continuous
development, coded exploiting the object-oriented Matlab
programming environment. It allows to define specialized
solution sequences including any reliability method. Fur-
thermore, thanks to the strong flexibility, new reliability
methods or optimization algorithms can be easily added.
The computational framework is organized in classes, i.e.
data structures consisting of data fields and methods
together with their interactions and interfaces (Patelli et al.
2012). Objects (i.e., instances of classes) can be then easily
aggregated, forming more complex objects and being
processed according to the related methods in order to
obtain the output of interest. The numerical implementa-
tion associated with this study consists mainly of two
classes: the first of these, Node, provides the basic input of
the graphical model.
According to the nature of the variable represented, four
different categories for the Node type can be identified:
• discrete, including nodes whose CPDs can contain
either exact probability values or probability bounds.
• probabilistic, including continuous nodes whose CPDs
contain stochastic variables or vectors of stochastic
variables;
• bounded, embracing nodes enclosing interval variables;
• imprecise probabilistic, referring to nodes representing
imprecise random variables.
The combination of more Node objects allows the con-
struction of the EnhancedBayesianNetwork object, defined
by its namesake class. These two classes together provide
the graphical and numerical implementation of the
Enhanced Bayesian Network model. Their interaction with
the reliability methods available in the OpenCossan
framework provides the reduction of the initial network to
traditional BNs or BNs including probability bounds,
according to the procedure described previously.
Several methods, borrowed from the field of structural
reliability, are available in the toolbox for the efficient
solution of Eq.(5). Generally, the nature of the variables
involved, together with the desired degree of accuracy, leads
the selection of the method to adopt. In more detail, four
cases can be easily identified: only probabilistic and discrete
variables involved, only bounded and discrete variables
involved, both probabilistic and bounded variables involved
and, finally, any kind of variable including imprecise random
variables. In the first case Eq.(5) would involve only tradi-
tional probabilistic variables and can hence be efficiently
solved through the use of both traditional or advanced (e.g.,
Line Sampling or Important Sampling) MC methods
(Koutsourelakis et al. 2004) as well as semi-probabilistic
methods such the First Order Reliability method (FORM)
(Kiureghian 2005). In the second case, where the input
consists of discrete and interval variables, the method pro-
posed by Jiang et al. (2011) and based on the use of convex
sets can be adopted. It is opportune to specify that in this case
the result of the computation cannot be considered a proba-
bility value, conversely provides only a coarse information
regarding the possibility of failure. This would lead to
overestimate the probability of the event under study, which
would be assumed as 1 even if the event is only possible and
no more information about its actual likelihood is available.
It is hence highly recommendable to avoid this kind of set-
up. The third case refers to the presence of probabilistic and
interval variables in input and can be computed through the
use of twomethods available in the toolbox: the first refers to
the work of Luo et al. (2009) and is based on the mixture of
sets of continuous probability distributions and convex sets
of intervals on which a nested minimization problem is
computed. The other method available consists of coupling
advanced Monte Carlo methods (i.e., Adaptive Line Sam-
pling) with optimization methods in order to estimate the
lower and upper bounds of the failure probability (Angelis
et al. 2015). Dissimilarly from the previous, this approach
allows for both imprecise probability distribution functions
(i.e., credal sets) and sets of bounded variables. The main
advantage of this approach is the possibility to provide the
probability bounds for the event of interest without approx-
imating the limit state function. Moreover it is largely
applicablewith significant benefits in terms of computational
cost: the efficiency of the strategy is independent of the
magnitude of the failure probability, which is a large
advantage in comparison to traditional approaches such as
directMC, and ensures the feasibility of the computation also
in high dimensional spaces with a limited number of sam-
ples. Furthermore, this latter method is the only one suit-
able for problems involving imprecise random variables
(e.g., probabilistic variables with uncertain but bounded
parameters).
The computation of inference on the reduced network
can be carried out through the use of built-in inference
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algorithms as well as through the interaction of the tool
with the Bayes’ Toolbox for MATLAB (Murphy 2001).
Figure 3 depicts the main structure of the computational
tool implemented.
To sum up, the approach described suggests to process the
implemented models following a two-step procedure: first,
the network containing probabilistic, non-probabilistic,
hybrid and discrete variables is reduced to a BN containing
crisp and interval probabilities through the use of numerical
methods imported from the field of structural reliability; in a
second phase, the inference of the events of interests repre-
sented by the model is performed through the use of tradi-
tional exact inference algorithms. These two stages of the
analysis are associated with different requirements and
hence can be characterized by different computational times.
The reduction of the network can be considered as part of the
model design itself and hence can also not be associated with
particular time requirements. On the contrary, since the tool
is designed to provide both long-term and near real-time
decision making support, the results of inference computa-
tion on the network (e.g. the estimation of the probability
associated with a certain accident scenario) should be pro-
vided within the shortest time possible, offering a valid
support also in case of emergency. The proposed approach,
thanks to the reduction of the network to only discrete and
interval probabilities, reduces the computational costs of
inference without affecting the accuracy of the analysis and
allows the satisfaction of this requirement.
Input
Graphical
Model
Inference
Output
Reduction
Node
+Sname
+Stype
+CPD
+Cparents
EnhancedBayesianNetwork
+Cnodes
+Mdag
+Mcorrelation
+computeContinuousNodes()
+discretizeNode()
+reduce2BN()
Marginal Probability Values
Bayes’Toolbox for Matlab
Bayesian Network
(reduced EBN)
+computeInference()
+introduceEvidence()
Reliability Toolbox
+Monte Carlo Methods
(Probabilistic)
+First Order Reliability Method
(Probabilistic)
+Advanced Line Sampling
(Hybrid)
+FORM with convex set mixed model
(Hybrid)
Fig. 3 Simplified representation of the computational toolbox
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3 Vulnerability analysis of nuclear facilities
The purpose of the model implemented in this work is to
quantify the probability associated to several accident
scenarios and failure events involving a fuel pond subject
to the threat of flooding events, overcoming the limitations
highlighted in a previous study and associated with the
adoption of traditional BNs (Tolo et al. 2016). The draw-
backs of such an approach were mainly linked to the use of
crisp probabilities, which cannot fully represent the alea-
tory and epistemic uncertainty affecting the variables (a
crucial aspect for climate variables and projections); a
further restriction is the impossibility to take into account
correlation among nodes when causal models are not
available for the graphical representation of the depen-
dencies but this information is available only numerically
(e.g., through the estimation of correlation factors from
experimental data). Both these issues are overcome in the
current model: the framework implemented includes
probabilistic, interval and hybrid variables as well as
probability intervals, fully capturing the information
available and its imprecision. Moreover, the method
adopted allows to relax the usual BN constraints regarding
the variables correlation, including it within the structural
reliability analysis when required.
The model proposed takes into account the flood hazard
as main source of risk, estimating its evolution over time in
light of the effect of climate change. Moreover the con-
sequences of eventual human errors and their interaction
with natural hazards are included in the analysis.
Extreme weather events have the capability to affect the
facility on different levels. On the one hand, they threaten
the safety of the installation directly, for instance leading to
accumulation of water in the station, causing the failure of
drainage systems or even preventing the access to the
facility from the outside. On the other, the primary impact
of natural hazards can result in much wider accident sce-
narios, triggering chains of failures within the station (e.g.,
the accumulation of water can lead to flood barriers failure
thus to the unavailability of emergency generators
increasing the possibility of a station black-out).
The model aims to capture an overall picture of the
possible accident scenarios. Three sections can be identi-
fied in the network according to their task: the first one
aims to capture the primary impact of the natural hazards
on the facility and thus models the direct interaction
between the natural events and the technological installa-
tion. It embraces variables related to natural events (e.g.,
extreme rainfall, extreme high tide etc.) which are directly
linked to external subsystems of the facility (e.g., drainage
system, outfall etc.). In light of the aleatory nature of
weather events and the strong influence of epistemic
uncertainty on climate variables predictions, this subset of
the network contains most of the non-discrete variables of
the overall model.
A second section of the network aims to depict the
possible chains of failures internal to the system. Due to the
nature of the technological failures here represented, all the
variables of this subset are of a discrete nature and, more
specifically, boolean. Nevertheless, differently from pre-
vious studies, the numerical frame associated with this
section captures the uncertainty affecting the data available
through the adoption of probability bounds instead of crisp
probabilities. This way, the information available in the
literature (e.g., regarding the failure rate of industrial
machines) is fully represented.
Finally, a third part of the network, gathered from a
previous study (Groth and Mosleh 2011) and integrated in
the overall model, takes into account the probability of
human error which can contribute to the overall growth of
risk. This section, shown in Fig. 13, integrates in the
framework Performance Influencing Factors (PIFs)
enabling analysts to adapt the network to the system under
study in light of event data collection and analysis. How-
ever data limitations have precluded the further develop-
ment of this part of the model, which remains consistent
with the previous model.
The framework proposed is shown in Fig. 4 and consists
of 63 nodes. The marginal probability associated to any
event represented by one or more of the nodes can be
computed, offering an important insight of the failure
mechanisms provoked by the interaction between extreme
weather events and the facility and providing the decision
maker with useful information for long-term as well as
emergency risk management.
In the following, the description of the network and
its application to the real-world case-study of Sizewell
B nuclear power station in East Anglia is presented.
First, a brief description of the facility is proposed,
followed by a detailed description of the natural-tech-
nological interaction and internal failure sections. For
further details on the human error section please consult
the previous study (Tolo et al. 2016). Since each node
of the network is designed to represent a specific event,
if not differently specified, the terms defining each node
and the related event are considered interchangeable
from now on. Earthquakes or extreme winds and other
sources of risks different from flooding fall outside the
area of interest of the current model. In spite of this
restriction and the application to a specific case-study,
the network proposed in this paper can be easily
modified to capture the features of different facilities or
even adapted to enlarge the range of external hazards
included in the analysis.
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3.1 Case-study
The case-study selected for the application of the proposed
model is the nuclear power station of Sizewell B, operated
by EDF and located on the coast of East Anglia in the
county of Suffolk, UK. One of the main reasons behind this
choice is the particularly interesting location of the facility
whose surroundings, according to the flood maps provided
by the Environment Agency Environment Agency (2014),
are subject to the risk of flooding. In addition to this, the
closure of the facility, initially planned for 2035, has been
postponed to 2055 to meet EDF’s strategic target (Houlton
2013): this makes even more crucial to evaluate the impact
of climate change on the risks to which the facility is and
will be subject during its operational life.
Differently from other sites in the UK, such as Magnox
and AGR, the strategy for the Sizewell station consists of
long-term storage of the spent fuel under water and on-site
(Office for Civil Nuclear Security 2004). This clearly sets
high capacity requirements, which have led to the con-
struction of a new dry fuel storage to guarantee the nec-
essary storage volume. Finally, the plan for the
construction of a new power plant on the area adjacent to
the facility under study makes this analysis potentially
useful for further developments and applications.
Sizewell B is currently the youngest of the UK nuclear
power plants and provides approximately 3% of the
overall UK’s power demand. The communication with the
national grid is realized at three different 400 kV nodes,
at Bramford, Norwich and Pelham, to which the on-site
electrical substation is connected. On the south of Size-
well B is located the station of Sizewell A, no longer
operational, while on the eastern side lie the so called
Bent Hills. These are steady sand ridges which reach a
maximum height of 10 m in correspondence of the east
boundary of the station, sloping down to the shoreline:
they act as the sea wall of the station which hence results
100 m distant from the shore. The area surrounding the
station on the other directions is mainly marshland subject
to the risk of flooding. The entry of the nuclear site is
located in correspondence of the access road built at 3.5
m AOD. The spent nuclear fuel is stored together with the
new assemblies under water in a stainless steel pool. The
depth of water at which the fuel is kept ensures the
coverage of the elements for 24 h even in the case of
complete loss of power and then cooling. This is provided
by a cooling system, separate from that of the reactor,
which provides the thermal exchange between the
pumped flow and the seawater (default heat-sink). A
second heat-sink based on an air-cooling mechanism is
also available in case of emergency or failure of the
primary cooling circuit. The availability of electrical
power on-site binds the working order of the cooling
system in the fuel facilities. These are located next to the
reactor building and, as all the other sensible buildings,
are equipped with fire doors which are expected to act as
flood barriers with a design basis of 1 m of water (EDF
Energy 2013). A reservoir with a maximum water level of
13.9 m AOD and an invert level of 6.9 m AOD is also
located on site (Sizewell 2011).
Fig. 4 Overview of the EBN model proposed for the vulnerability
analysis and risk exposure quantification of spent nuclear fuel ponds
subject to the risk of flooding: rectangular-shaped nodes are of the
discrete type, circular-shaped probabilistic, ellipsoidal-shaped
bounded and trapezoidal-shaped hybrid
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3.2 Natural-technological interaction section
The aim of this subset of the network (shown in Fig. 5) is to
model the direct interaction between external events (i.e.,
natural hazards) and the nuclear facility, including its
surroundings. In light of this, the nodes involved in this
section can be categorized according to their task and
consequently the nature of the related variables.
Node as WindWavePeriod, WindWaveHeight, SwellPe-
riod, SwellHeight, IncidentWaveHeight, IncidentWavePe-
riod, ExtremePrecipitation represent climate variables and
are represented by probabilistic nodes (ellipsoidal nodes in
Fig. 5). Indeed, the aleatory essence of weather phe-
nomenons such as precipitations or sea conditions, are well
depicted by probabilistic variables: large sets of data are
available for the implementation of these models and a
remarkable part of the scientific literature has been dedicated
in the last decades to identify the most suitable distribution
types for the representation of natural events such as wave
conditions. Conversely, failure events such those involving
subsystems of the facility and directly triggered by the nat-
ural events, such as OutfallFailure, DischargeFailure, have
a boolean nature which can be adequately represented
through discrete variables (rectangular nodes in Fig. 5).
Similarly, FloodingSurroundings refers to the failure of
local flooding defences to keep the water level under a value
which can affect the station (i.e., the elevation of the access
roads): also this event has an intrinsic boolean nature and
hence can be represented by a discrete node. In order to map
future risk of flooding, climate change projections regarding
future sea and surge level values (respectively SeaLevelRise
and SurgeTrend) are included in this section. The inner
variability of climate at both global and local scale, regard-
less human influences, together with the incomplete
knowledge of the climate system and the inability to model it
perfectly, make any estimate of future climate conditions
strongly affected by uncertainty. This plays hence a crucial
role in the analysis of future risks when considering the
prediction of future behaviours of such aleatory phe-
nomenons: coherently, the predicted values are generally
inferred from sophisticatedmathematical models which give
spatial and temporal details and provide estimations of the
uncertainty associated with each variable. To fully capture
this information in themodel, the related nodes SeaLevelRise
and SurgeTrend are characterized by interval variables. The
result of the combination of these latter with the probabilistic
distributions of extreme high tide and extreme surge baselines
are imprecise random distributions (trapezoidal nodes in
Fig. 5) which depict the trend of ExtremeHighTide and Ex-
tremeSurge over the time domain analysed. Apart from cli-
mate change projections, interval variables are also adopted
to characterize several structural parameters considered
affected by imprecision (i.e., SeaWallInclination, LocalDe-
fenceHeight, DrainageSystemCapacity, OutfallCapacity,
GrossStationArea, FloorAreaRatio, FloodBarriersCapacity,
HighTideDuration and SeawallLength).
Conversely from the other nodes mentioned, the func-
tion of the discrete nodes TimeScenario and EmissionSce-
nario is quite unique within the model proposed. They can
be considered as selectors for scenarios based on a par-
ticular time of reference and conjectures about the possible
future. This hypothesis, on which the projection inference
Fig. 5 Section of the network modelling the direct effects of natural events on the facility
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itself is based, is enclosed in the so called emission sce-
narios, according to the Special Report on Emissions
Scenarios (SRES) nomenclature (Nakicenovic and Swart
2000). Each of these scenarios characterize a different
possible future on the basis of greenhouse emissions trends
and expected evolution of human activities. All together
these scenarios represent a set of comprehensive global
narratives, or story-lines, that define local, regional and
global socio-economic driving forces of change such as
economy, population, technology, energy and agriculture,
key determinants of the future emissions pathway.
In the current application the node TimeScenario
embraces seven outcome states referring to as many time
slices, according to the projections available: 2010–2039,
2020–2049, 2030–2059, 2040–2069, 2050–2079,
2060–2089 and 2070–2099. The node EmissionScenario
has been restricted to the medium emission scenario (A1B
according to the UKCP09 nomenclature). The assumptions
behind the latter refers to an increasingly flourish economy,
and a significant population growth peaking in 2050 at 8.7
billion and then declining to 7.1 billion in 2100. From a
technological point of view, new technologies are expected
to successfully penetrate the market going along with a
more balanced use of fossil and non-fossil energy sources.
As previously mentioned, the effect of climate change
on the sea conditions is modelled through the connection
between the scenario nodes on the one hand, and the nodes
SurgeTrend and SeaLevelRise on the other. Hence, to each
combination of TimeScenario and EmissionScenario cor-
responds a specific sea level rise interval stored in the node
SeaLevelRise. The SeaLevelRise intervals are defined by
bounds equal to the 5th and 95th percentile of the projected
values. Similarly, the node SurgeTrend takes into account
the predicted trend of surge for the time period of refer-
ence. Also in this case the intervals adopted refer to the 5
and 95th percentile projections bounds. Both the sea level
rise and surge trend projections have been provided by the
UK Climate Projections (UKCP09) MetOffice (2014) up to
2100. The trends given above are combined linearly with
the mean of near-present day extreme surge and extreme
tide baselines (Figs. 6 and 7) to obtain imprecise random
variables for projections of future extreme sea level trends.
The current return values related to the extreme high tide
for the coast of Sizewell have been provided by the
Environment Agency whilst the distribution related to the
ExtremeSurge has been gathered from BODC data refer-
ring to the East Anglia coast (NOC 2015). Variations
related to seasons have not been considered.
Previous studies (Lowe et al. 2009) have shown that it is
reasonable to add mean sea level changes linearly to the
storminess-driven change component around the UK coast.
In light of this, where required (i.e., to compute the prob-
ability associated with the nodes OutfallFailure, Flood-
ingSurroundings, FloodingStationArea), the future extreme
sea level values have been computed as a linear combi-
nation of ExtremeHighTide and ExtremeSurge under the
assumption of independence.
Also the event ExtremePrecipitation is directly affected
by the time and emission scenario considered. The proba-
bilistic models representing this event have been imple-
mented on the basis of the results of previous studies
(Francis 2011), which provide return periods and the
related uncertainty according to the Season, TimeScenario
and EmissionScenario of reference. Fig. 8 shows the
empirical distribution adopted for the 100-year return
period ExtremePrecipitation expected for the time slice
2030–2059.Also extreme wave conditions are expected to be
affected by climate change hence be dependent on the time
period considered: unfortunately, the studies addressing this
topic and the related projections are strongly affected by
uncertainty and often incongruous due to contradictory data
and limitations of the models adopted (Seneviratne et al.
2012; Leake et al. 2007). For this reason, the nodes related
to wave conditions and the node TimeScenario have been
considered independent. Similarly, also the emission sce-
nario selected is assumed not to affect the wave character-
istics: studies conducted on a local scale on the coast of East
Anglia have highlighted how, in the southern part of the
region, where the station is located, the adoption of different
emission scenarios had only negligible impact on the esti-
mate of the projections for wave conditions (Chini et al.
2010). The same study found offshore extremes not to be
significantly affected by sea level rise, which results negli-
gible in comparison to offshore water depths. As a conse-
quence of this, the scenario nodes and sea state nodes
(WindWavePeriod, WindWaveHeight, SwellPeriod, Swell-
Height, IncidentWaveHeight, IncidentWavePeriod) are not
connected in the network and thus assumed independent.
All the nodes of these section are linked to each other on
the basis of their causal relationships in order to draw a
path of the possible mechanisms of flooding which can
affect the facility. In the current model, these can be
classified in three categories:
1. Surface water flooding
2. River and tidal flooding
3. Sea wave overtopping
The first of this mechanism of flooding refers to the
occurrence of the event DischargeFailure, hence to the
impossibility of discharging water from the station leading
to its accumulation within the facility area. The failure of
the overall discharge system is assumed to occur in the case
of failure of both the station drainage system and outfall.
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The event DrainageSystemFailure is verified when the
amount of ExtremePrecipitation overcomes the capacity of
the drainage system (DrainageSystemCapacity). Similarly,
the station outfall is assumed to fail when the still water
level, i.e. combination of ExtremeHighTide and Ex-
tremeSurge, results higher than the OutfallCapacity.
As a consequence of this simultaneous failure, the
rainfall water is considered to accumulate within the station
perimeter regardless the topological profile of the site. Both
OutfallCapacity and DrainageSystemCapacity are param-
eters assumed to be known with a certain degree of
imprecision and are hence represented by intervals centred
in the systems design basis values. These have been
assumed equal to 300 mm/d for the DrainageSystemCa-
pacity and 5 m for the OutfallCapacity on the basis of the
literature available (EDF Energy 2013). The bounds
adopted for the interval variables are shown in Table 1.
Since the storm surge consists of a meteorologically-
driven component of water level generated by synoptic
variations of atmospheric pressure and wind (Wolf 2009), a
certain relation between ExtremePrecipitation and Ex-
tremeSurge would be expected. In spite of this, studies
focusing on the Eastern British coast stated that it is mainly
precipitation in the northern part of the coast that shows
Fig. 6 Gumbel probability
distribution used as baseline for
ExtremeSurge
Fig. 7 Return period curve used
as baseline for
ExtremeHighTide
Fig. 8 Cumulative probability
distribution for the 100-year
return period of
ExtremePrecipitation for the
time slice 2030–2059
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dependence with daily maximum sea surge, while for the
Anglian coast only low or non-significant dependencies
have been found (probably due to the different tide-surge
interaction). In light of this, in the current study the relation
between ExtremePrecipitation and ExtremeSurge is con-
sidered low enough to be approximated with independence
(Svensson and Jones 2002).
In addition to the surface water flooding, heavy rainfall
and extreme sea level can also lead to other flooding mech-
anisms able to affect the area surrounding the station, such as
river and tidal flooding. The event FloodingSurroundings,
which embraces these two contributions, is assumed to occur
when the water depth reaches the access road level.
The river flooding is mainly due to the interaction
between ExtremePrecipitation and water bodies present in
the area. With regards to the case-study analysed, no
external models have been adopted: this contribution alone
is presumed not able to lead to the FloodingSurroundings
according to previous studies (EDF Energy 2013). Never-
theless, existent models and historical data can be easily
integrated in the network to represent this mechanism and
verify the hypothesis introduced.
Here, the node ExtremePrecipitation is assumed to have
the potential to affect the access road, triggering the event
FloodingSurroundings, only in association with tidal
flooding. This latter is considered to happen when the
combination of ExtremeTide and ExtremeSurge overcomes
the height of the SeaDefencesHeight. This parameter is
represented by a bounded node covering an interval
between 3.88 and 4.12 m. On the contrary, thanks to the
elevation of the site, tidal flooding does not have the
potential to affect the station. Furthermore, the risk of
significant tsunamis on European coasts is generally neg-
ligible (Kerridge 2005).
Dissimilarly, the sea wave overtopping (Fig. 9) of the
station’s sea wall could cause the penetration of sea water
in the perimeter of the facility (Kopytko and Perkins 2011)
and is hence considered the only coastal flooding mecha-
nism able to contribute to the FloodingStationArea event.
The quantification of the risk of flooding from the sea
implies modelling the mechanism of discharge of sea water
within the station perimeter due to the action of sea waves.
This has been realized integrating in the current framework
an EBN model previously developed (Tolo et al. 2015) for
the quantification of sea wave overtopping hazard. The
related sub-part of the network is based on the approach
suggested by Reis et al. (2006) and involves 16 nodes of
the natural hazard section (i.e., SwellHeight, SwellPeriod,
WindWavePeriod, WindWaveHeight, IncidentWavePeriod,
IncidentWaveHeight, SeaWallInclination, ParameterA,
ParameterB, ParameterC, CrestLevel, SlopeRoughness,
SeaWallLength, ScatterParameter, ExtremeHighTide and
ExtremeSurge). Waves are assumed to overcome the
defences only if the condition 0 ðCL SWLÞ
rCHs
\1 is
verified, where CL measures the highest elevation of the
seawall, SWL the average sea water surface elevation
(taking into account both ExtremeHighTide and Ex-
tremeSurge), r the seawall SlopeRoughness, Hs the Inci-
dentWaveHeight (i.e., combination of the significant wave
height of wind waves and swell). Similarly, C represents
the ratio of the maximum vertical extent of wave up-rush
on the structure (Sorensen 2006) to the waves significant
height and is a function of the so called surf similarity
parameter np. This latter is computed as:
np ¼
tanðaÞffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
2pHs=gT2p
q ð6Þ
where Tp represents the IncidentWavePeriod (i.e., combi-
nation of the peak periods of wind waves and swell).
Hence, given seawall features such as SlopeRoughness and
SeaWallInclination [a in Eq.(6)], the overtopping rate can
be expressed as:
Q ¼ A
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
gðCHsÞ3
q
1 CL SWL
r CHsð Þ
 eBB
ð7Þ
where g refers to the gravitational acceleration, A and B
to empirical coefficients (ParameterA, ParameterB)
of the model dependent on the SeaWallInclination (Reis
Table 1 Discharge system capacity input
Node Unit Interval
DrainageSystemCapacity mm/day [281.0–309.0]
OutfallCapacity m [4.850–5.150]
Fig. 9 Representation of the overtopping process for sea waves: CL
is the Crest Level of the structure, a its inclination, SWL the average
water surface elevation at any instant, Q the rate of water overcoming
the seawall
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et al. 2008) and eB to a parameter which represents the
scatter about the line of perfect agreement between the
predicted and measured values of the mean discharge
(ScatterParameter). On the contrary, if the condition
0 ðCL SWLÞ
rCHs
\1 is not verified the overtopping rate
results equal to zero.
This model allows for bi-modal sea representation
which means that the seawall of the facility is assumed
exposed to waves generated locally by winds as well as
long-period waves associated with distant storms (i.e.,
swell). Indeed, although swell waves tend to have lower
wave heights than wind-sea waves around England and
Wales, their much higher periods can lead to higher run-up
and overtopping of sea defence (Hawkes et al. 1997). Data
regarding swell and bi-modal wave climate around the
coast of England are provided by Hawkes et al. (1997):
those adopted for this study refer to the Suffolk area and
are represented in Fig. 10. On the basis of the information
available, a Weibull distribution was adopted for the sig-
nificant swell height (SwellHeight) with a mean of 0.121 m
and standard deviation 0.307 m. For the swell peak periods,
an empirical distribution was derived with mean 12.04 s
and standard deviation 2.46 s. Generally, for swell condi-
tions, higher waves tend to have shorter periods: a linear
correlation coefficient of -0.032 has been computed from
the data available. Probabilistic distributions for the wind
waves conditions (WindWavePeriod, WindWaveHeight)
have been implemented fitting historical data (CEFAS
2014) to generalized extreme value distributions (see
Table 2) adopting the maximum likelihood approach. A
linear correlation coefficient of 0.29 between the two
variables, represented by the continuous line in Fig. 11, has
been computed. Since swell waves are not well correlated
with local meteorological conditions they results only
weakly correlated with either extreme wind-seas or surge
water levels (Hawkes et al. 1997).
In light of this, the correlation between ExtremeSurge
and swell conditions has been neglected whilst a linear
correlation factor of -0.06 has been assumed between
WindWaveHeight and SwellWaveHeight (McMillan et al.
2011). Also, a correlation coefficient of 0.659 has been
assumed between WindWaveHeight and ExtremeSurge, on
the basis of the information provided by Hawkes and
Svensson (2003). Since from the data available it is not
possible to identify a clear trend for the seasonal variability
of waves and swell conditions this has been neglected. A
further assumption concerns the direction of the waves,
which have been considered to be normally incident to the
structure. Finally, no wave transformation models has been
adopted. This simplificative hypothesis is expected to result
in a strongly conservative approach. The nodes Inci-
dentSignificantHeight and IncidentPeakPeriod are com-
puted according to Eqs.(8) and (9).
Hs ¼ H2sðwÞ þ H2sðsÞ
 	1
2 ð8Þ
Tp ¼
m0ðsÞT4pðwÞ þ m0ðwÞT4pðsÞ
m0ðwÞ þ m0ðsÞ
 !1
4
ð9Þ
where HsðwÞ, TpðwÞ represent the WindWaveHeight and
WindWavePeriod, HsðsÞ and TpðsÞ the SwellHeight and
SwellPeriod, and m0ðwÞ m0ðsÞ the zero-th moment of the
wind-sea and swell spectrum of surface elevation. Pa-
rameterA, ParameterB and ParameterC depend on the
inclination of the seawall and the waves characteristics.
Please refer to Reis et al. (2008) for further details on their
computation. All the parameters involved in the calculation
are assumed to be affected by imprecision and then rep-
resented as bounded nodes. Table 3 shows the interval
values adopted as input.
The simultaneous occurrence of the flooding dynamics
mentioned can cause the event FloodingStationArea: the
facility is assumed flooded when the accumulation of water
within its area reaches depths higher than those considered
as design basis for the on-site FloodBarrierCapacity. If
such a case is verified, the water is assumed to penetrate the
buildings of the nuclear island and to affect the subsystems
there located. As a consequence of this, chains of internal
failures can be triggered according to the mechanisms
modelled by the dedicated section of the network.
Fig. 10 Probability of occurrence of swell for different combinations
of swell height and swell period
Table 2 Generalized extreme value distributions parameters
Parameter WindWaveHeight WindWavePeriod
Shape parameter 0.268026 0.00512954
Scale parameter 0.280391 1.45702
Location parameter 0.539845 4.62444
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3.3 Internal failure section
As anticipated in the previous paragraphs, the section
modelling the internal chains of events which can lead to
simultaneous failures and eventually to the exposure of fuel
(Fig. 12) embraces only discrete nodes, coherently with the
nature of the events involved. On the other hand, it is worth
to clarify that this does not exclude the use of probability
intervals in the definition of an event of interest: each state
of a discrete node can be associated with probability
bounds instead of singular values in case of uncertain or
contradictory data. The input associated with this section of
the network have been deduced either from previous
studies or, more generally, from data available in literature.
Where probability bounds were available they have been
included in the analysis.
Only if both the cooling system and the emergency
supplies are out of order the exposure of the fuel assem-
blies (SpentFuelExposure) becomes possible. The cooling
system of the spent fuel pond is assumed not to function in
the case of lack of both OnSiteAC (i.e., electric power
produced on-site) and OffSiteAC (i.e., provided by the
national grid) (Baranowsky 1985). The first can be
unavailable due to either planned, such as refuelling
operations, or unplanned power station outages, such as
emergency reactor shut-downs. These would cause the
failure of the EmergencyPowerSupplies which, for the
power plant under study, consist of four emergency diesel
generators. These provide power to the safety buses to
guarantee the correct functioning of crucial systems in the
case of unavailability of other power sources (Kancev and
Duchac 2013). Coherently, in the current model the failure
of the EmergencyPowerSupplies is a precursor of station
blackout in association with the loss of OffSiteAC. In the
case of closure of the station, as for the last three time
scenarios, the failure of the EmergencyPowerSupplies is a
sufficient condition for the lack of OnSiteAC. The proba-
bility values associated with the nodes PlannedOutage and
UnplannedOutage have been deduced from the occurrence
of past events, on the basis of the information provided by
EDF Energy (2014). The probability bounds for the events
of failure of EmergencyPowerSupplies have been deduced
combining the rate of failure to start and to run within an
hour from the start of the four independent generators
available on-site (Eide et al. 2007). On the other hand, the
unavailability of OffSiteAC can be due to the failure of
either the OnSiteSubstation or the ExternalPowerGrid
(Liscouski and Elliot 2004). This latter event implies the
simultaneous failure of the three connection points to
which the Sizewell B on-site substation is linked in the 400
kV system (substations at Bramford, Norwich and Pelham).
In light of the large distance among the substations, these
are considered not to be affected by the eventual extreme
weather conditions at Sizewell and are considered inde-
pendent from each other. The failure rate of the electric
substations, regardless external event, has been gathered
from the existent literature (Nack 2005). In the case of a
general loss of external power grid the nuclear plant is
assumed to shut down safely (UnplannedOutage), accord-
ing to procedures (Maldonado 2004).
A further eventuality modelled by this section of the
network is the lack of actions to prevent the exposure of the
fuel in the case ofmalfunctioning of the cooling system. This
scenario is summarized by the node EmergencySupplies,
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Fig. 11 Correlation between significant wave height (Hm0) and peak period (Tp) measurements
Table 3 Interval input of sea wave overtopping model
Node Unit Interval
SeaWallLength m [348.0–352.0]
SeaWallInclination rad [0.0500–0.0526]
SlopeRoughness [0.80–1.00]
HighTideDuration s [9000–12600]
StationArea m2 [132492–134492]
FloorAreaRatio [0.7138–0.7397]
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which takes into consideration both technological failures
and human errors. Both these cases refer to the intervention
of operators to refill the pond with high purity water possibly
from an external storage tank through the use of third systems
(e.g., fire system) (Adorni et al. 2015). Due to the lack of
related information, possible losses associated with the
storage and the water inventory are not modelled, whilst the
only technological failure considered refer to the Emergen-
cyHydrantSystem, which are supposed to be used to pump
the water flow into the pond. The malfunctioning of these
systems would impede to make-up for the water evaporated
from the pond due to overheating. Also the event Hu-
manError is assumed to lead to similar consequences and
refers to the lack of action by operators.
Even in the case of occurrence of either HumanError or
the malfunction of EmergencyHydrantSystem, the exposure
of the spent fuel can still be avoided. Indeed, the depth of
water in the pond is designed to ensure thermal inertia,
providing adequate coverage for the assemblies up to 24 h
in order to give time to act from the outside, for example
through the use of fire tenders. Only if also this action is
ineffective (DelayInReaction), due for instance to the
inaccessibility of the station (i.e., access road flooded), the
EmergencySupplies are supposed to fail.
The connection of this part of the model to the former
one is guaranteed by the nodes FloodingSurroundings,
FloodingStationArea and TimeScenario, which have the
capability to directly affect the state of the subsystems of
the facility. The flooding in the surrounding area can
impede the access to the station by fire tenders, due to its
capability to affect the access road. Similarly, the event
FloodingStationArea has the potential to cause the mal-
function of diesel generators and hydrant systems as pre-
viously described. The node TimeScenario allows to select
the state of the station, operational or closed, in order to
consider the availability of power generation on-site.
Finally, as mentioned, the event HumanError represents
the lack of actions by the operators and ismodelled according
to the study of Groth and Mosleh (2011) through a further
section of the model shown in Fig. 13. Table 4 shows the
probability bounds adopted for the subsystems failure state,
given the absence of flooding in the station.
3.4 Results
The results obtained from the inference computation on the
reduced model (Fig. 14) appear to be affected by uncer-
tainty which generally grows along with time, coherently
with the uncertainty affecting the climate projections in
input. On the contrary, the probability bounds computed
for the single events do not show a general monotonic
Fig. 12 Section of the network modelling internal failures
2748 Stoch Environ Res Risk Assess (2017) 31:2733–2756
123
Fig. 13 Section of the network modelling human failures according to Groth and Mosleh
Table 4 Failure probability
bounds adopted for
technological subsystems
Node State Probability bounds
OnSiteSubstation Failure (no flood) [5:67 1003 5:72 1003]
ExternalPowerGrid Failure (no flood) [1:82 1007 1:87 1007]
EmergencyHydrantSystem Failure (no flood) [4:80 1003 3:00 1001]
EmergencyPowerSupplies Failure (no flood, 4 generators) [8:17 1009 8:11 1008]
TimeScenario
EmissionScenario
CrestLevel
PrecipitationReturnPeriod
Season
OutfallFailure
DrainageSystemFailure
FloodingSurroundingsDischargeFailure
FloodingStationArea
SpentFuelExposure
CoolingSystemOnSiteAC
PlannedOutage
Closure EmergencySupplies
UnplannedOutage
OffSiteAC
ExternalPowerGrid
DelayInReaction
NumberEmergencyDiesels
EmergencyPowerSupplies
OnSiteSubstation
EmergencyHydrantSystem
OrganizationalCulture
Team
Training
Resources
Knowledge
Machine
Attitude
Complexity
Loads&perceptions
ErrorContext1
ErrorContext2
ErrorContext3
ErrorContext4
HumanError
Fig. 14 BN resulting from the reduction procedure
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growth. This is due again to the trend of the projections
adopted: while the sea level is expected to increase regu-
larly in time, the projections related to the extreme pre-
cipitation and surge trend do not show a similar behaviour.
In light of this, and considering the major contribution of
the tide over the surge on the still water level, the regular
growth of the probability bounds of the event Flood-
ingSurroundings shown in Fig. 16, should be attributed to
the trend of sea level projections. As shown in the graph,
the probability of this events grows from an interval of
[6.25 9 10-03, 2.05 9 10-02] in the first time scenario to
one of [8.77 9 10-03, 1.10 9 10-01], suggesting the
importance of both current and future risks. On the other
hand, events linked to the extreme precipitation occurrence
(such as FloodingStationArea shown in Fig. 18), are
characterized by a far less regular trend of probability in
time. As shown in Fig. 15, the probability of
SpentFuelExposure shows this kind of trend, which reveals
the strong connection between the possibility of exposure
of the spent fuel and the occurrence of FloodingSta-
tionArea. The probability associated to the overall expo-
sure event is expected to fall in an interval [3.28 9 10-09,
1.16 9 10-08] for the time slice 2010–2039 and [9.08 9
10-09, 2.97 9 10-07] for the period 2070–2099: the upper
bound of the probability increases of one order of magni-
tude along with the time domain considered.
As for the previous case, also the probability bounds
computed for the events of failure of the CoolingSystem
(Fig. 17) and FloodingStationArea (Fig. 18) fall entirely in
a quite negligible region, with a minimum lower bound
within an order of magnitude of 10-09 and a maximum
upper bound within an order of magnitude of 10-06 (time
Fig. 15 Probability of the event
SpentFuelExposure
Fig. 16 Probability of the event FloodingSurroundings
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scenario 2070–2099). The closeness between the proba-
bilities of the two events and their trend suggest the
flooding of the station to be the main possible cause of
failure of the cooling system.
Looking at the problem from the opposite perspective, it
is possible to estimate also the conditional probability of an
event of interest. Several What if scenarios have been
evaluated, with the aim of better understanding the distri-
bution of the risk within the model.
In the case of CoolingSystem failure, the probability of
exposure of the spent fuel (Fig. 19) grows significantly, up to
non-negligible values: the smaller values of probability are
registered for the time slice 2010–2039 and are equal to
[6.20 9 10-03, 2.10 9 10-02] and increase up to [8.73 9
10-03, 1.12 910-01] for the period 2070–2099. Similar
results are computed in the case of occurrence of the event
FloodingStationArea as shown in Fig. 20. Moreover, the
trend shown by the probability along with time highlights
the importance of the event FloodingSurroundings: in the
case of flooding of the station or failure of the cooling
system, actions to prevent the SpentFuelExposure are
required from outside and can be impeded in the case of
flooding of the surrounding area and inaccessibility of the
station. On the other hand, due to the low values of the
probability of FloodingStationArea, the effect of the
simultaneous occurrence of HumanError and FloodingSur-
roundings on the probability of SpentFuelExposure results
slighter (Fig. 21): the maximum values for the probability
bounds are registered for the time slice 2070–2099 and
define the interval [1.03 9 10-06, 2.72 9 10-06].
Fig. 17 Probability of the event
of failure of the CoolingSystem
Fig. 18 Probability of the event
FloodingStationArea
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4 Interpretation of the results and limitations
Almost all the probability intervals computed fall in a region
of negligibility of the risk (order of magnitude lower than
10-06) supporting the robustness of the system. Further
investments in the accuracy of the information available
would lead to a decrease of the uncertainty of the outputs,
hence to more precise results. Moreover, a large contribution
to the inaccuracy of the results could come from the intro-
duction of simplificative hypothesis in the model. For
instance, the introduction of off-shore in-shore transforma-
tion models could sensibly decrease the upper bound of the
FloodingStationArea probability. A crucial aspect for the
feasibility of this kind of analysis is the availability of
suitable data for the definition of input parameters. While
information regarding the performance of technological
components (hence related to the bottom section of the
model) are generally provided in the scientific literature,
studies regarding natural hazards, and in particular mod-
elling their future trend in view of the climate change, are
still few and often in disagreement. However, it must be
noticed that this complication is not uniquely associated
with the method proposed in this study, but generally
common to any kind of approach aiming to model the
interaction between natural events and technological instal-
lations. On the contrary, in comparison with more traditional
Fig. 19 Probability of the
SpentFuelExposure in the case
of CoolingSystem failure
Fig. 20 Probability of the
SpentFuelExposure in the case
of FloodingStationArea
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approaches, the method proposed allows the inclusion of the
uncertainty of the data available and even of eventual con-
trasting information, characterizing the output in light of the
degree of accuracy determined by the input.
The main drawback of the approach and model devel-
oped is the high computational effort which can prevent
real-time analysis of the initial network (although it does
not affect the computation of inference on the reduced
network). Nevertheless, it is worth to highlight that the
computation of the inference, thanks to the simplification
of the initial model, can be carried out in near-real time and
hence can provide support also in the case of emergency as
long as the reduction of the initial network has been pre-
viously accomplished. Algorithms able to identify the most
crucial events in terms of uncertainty propagation are
essential in order to tackle effectively the problem.
In light of this, the main target for further research
appears to be the implementation of theoretical and com-
putational tools able to map the contributions of the dif-
ferent variables to the overall uncertainty in output, in
order to obtain more accurate results at the lowest cost.
Also, future efforts will focus on the optimization of the
reduction procedure and the identification of the optimal
topology for the reduced network, in order to further
decrease the computational cost of the analysis.
5 Conclusions
A model for the quantification of the risk of exposure of
spent fuel stored in facilities subject to the risk of flooding
has been proposed and applied to the real-world case study
of Sizewell B nuclear power plant in East Anglia, UK. The
approach adopted for the study is based on a novel
methodology which allows to overcome the limitations of
traditional Bayesian Networks, not renouncing to their
potential. The framework implemented captures the
unavoidable epistemic uncertainty and aleatory nature of
the input through the adoption of discrete variables, prob-
abilistic models, intervals and imprecise random variables.
Moreover, it allows to perform the uncertainty propagation
within the network, quantifying the uncertainty affecting
the output, expressed by probability bounds. These capa-
bilities make the methodology proposed and its computa-
tional implementation a complete and effective tool for
risk-informed decision making support.
The analysis of the case-study selected has been
extended to several time scenarios, mapping the future
risks to which the facility is subject in light of the wors-
ening of natural hazards due to climate change. The results
highlight a general but not regular growth of the risk along
with time. The probability of accidents remains quite low
over the time domain considered, whilst the uncertainty in
output appears to grow coherently with that affecting the
projections adopted as input. What-if scenarios have been
considered in order to identify the crucial links of the chain
of events leading to the overall failure.
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